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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
LORENZO H. HUBBARD, : Case No. 900128-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
In a per curiam memorandum decision (not for publication) 
filed on November 14, 1990, this Court remanded this case to the 
trial court for more detailed findings of fact supporting the 
court's order denying Mr. Hubbard's motion to suppress evidence 
seized in a warrantless search. A copy of the opinion is attached 
as Appendix 1. 
Mr. Hubbard files this petition for rehearing, pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, because this Court's decision 
overlooks basic procedural standards designed to insure fair 
administration of burdens of proof and standards designed to 
conserve judicial resources.1 
1. For discussion of the circumstances justifying a 
petition for rehearing, see Brown v. Pickard, denying rehearing, 11 
P. 512 (Utah 1886); and Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY 
COUNSEL AGAINST REMAND AND 
COMPEL A DECISION ON THE MERITS BY THIS COURT. 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS CASE 
Mr. Hubbard entered a conditional no contest plea to one 
count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8 (R. 
66-72). 
The issue raised and briefed on the merits in Appellant's 
brief, relating to the suppression of evidence seized in a 
warrantless search, was properly raised at trial by trial counsel, 
through a pretrial motion to suppress, supporting memorandum of 
points and authorities, and oral argument after the evidentiary 
hearing on the motion (R. 37-44; T. 31-36). 
During the evidentiary hearing, the State went forward to 
meet its burden to justify the warrantless search, and was not 
limited by the trial court in any way during examination of 
witnesses or during argument (T. 1-37). The court adopted the 
position argued by the prosecutor (T. 30-39) and the prosecutor 
drafted the order denying suppression of the evidence, which order 
contained the trial court's findings (R. 62-63). 
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On appeal, Mr. Hubbard submitted an opening brief 
addressing the merits of the trial court's order deny suppression of 
the evidence seized without a warrant. See Appellant's brief, pages 
1 through 23. 
The State responded with a brief which did not address the 
merits of the issue, but alleged that the facts in the record were 
"greatly disputed", and that this Court could not perform meaningful 
appellate review in the absence of additional findings of fact by 
the trial court. See Respondent's brief, pages 1 through 5. 
In Mr. Hubbard's reply brief, he refuted the State's 
position, noting that the only factual dispute in the case was not 
important to the issues before this Court, noting that the record in 
this case was adequate to facilitate this Court's disposition of the 
case on the merits, and providing this Court with a copy of the 
record in this case to support Mr. Hubbard's assertions. See 
Appellant's Reply brief, pages 1 through 3 and Appendix 1. 
This Court issued its memorandum decision, agreeing with 
the State that remand was necessary in order to facilitate 
meaningful appellate review. See Appendix 1 of this petition. 
B. LEGAL ARGUMENT SUPPORTING REHEARING IN THIS CASE 
1. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
STANDARDS DESIGNED TO INSURE FAIR ADMINISTRATION 
OF BURDENS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS DESIGNED TO 
CONSERVE JUDICIAL RESOURCES. 
This Court should reconsider its decision in light of 
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standards designed to insure fair administration of burdens of 
proof, and in light of standards designed to conserve judicial 
resources, discussed infra. 
It was the State's burden of proof to justify the 
warrantless search. For a discussion of the State's burden of 
proving that warrantless searches fall within an exception to the 
warrant requirement, and the State's burden of proving voluntary, 
untainted consent, see State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
Burdens of proof are not merely substantive, but encompass 
procedural responsibilities as well. As the court explained in 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983), 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot 
merely assume that it was properly raised. The 
burden is on the parties to make certain that the 
record they compile will adequately preserve 
their arguments for review in the event of an 
appeal. 
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted). 
The State was not limited in any way in its effort to 
present evidence and argument in seeking to meet its burdens, and on 
appeal, the State presented no explanation for its failure to meet 
its substantive and procedural burdens of proof in the trial court. 
The State's arguments were adopted by the trial court and 
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the State drafted the order at issue on appeal. In Howard v. 
Howard. 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979), the court explained why these 
factors and policies of judicial economy counsel against a remand in 
this case: 
It is, of course, true that a party need not 
request an amendment to the findings of fact at 
the trial level in order to pursue an appeal 
thereon. When, however, a party drafts findings 
which are adopted by the court, and includes 
therein no mention of a material allegation of 
fact raised at trial, such party may be deemed to 
have waived any objection to the failure of the 
trial court to make such a finding. Such a 
waiver must be considered conclusive on appeal. 
To rule otherwise would permit a party tacitly to 
omit a material finding of fact from the proposed 
findings, and then pursue reversal as a matter of 
law due to failure of the trial court to make 
such a finding. 
Id. at 935. 
This Court allowed the State to successfully attack the 
findings of the trial court for the first time on appeal. This 
Court's ruling thus appears to violate the standard rule articulated 
by this Court in Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah 
App. 1989): 
It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance 
an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show 
that it was timely presented to the trial court 
in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon. Issues not raised in the trial court in 
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this 
court from considering their merits on appeal. 
Id. at 655 (emphasis by the Court, citations omitted). See also 
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American Coal Company v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984)(party 
may not raise issue for the first time on appeal; in order to raise 
issue before appellate court, party must file a cross appeal). 
2. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
THE BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS AND MR, HUBBARD'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
It was apparently this Court's opinion that factual and 
mixed factual and legal findings underlying Mr, Hubbard's motion to 
suppress must be made by the trial court. See Appendix 1. This 
view is unduly limits this Court's jurisdiction and thereby 
undercuts Mr. Hubbard's rights to appeal.2 
The State Constitution was amended in 1984, and as of July 
1, 1985, appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases is no longer 
limited to legal issues. Compare present Article VIII sections 3 
and 5 (in 1990 pocket supplement) with previous Article VIII section 
9 (in 1953 hardbound volume).3 
2. Mr. Hubbard is constitutionally entitled to an appeal as 
a matter of right. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 and 
Article VIII section 5. 
3. The current Article VIII section 3 provides, 
The supreme court shall have original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. The supreme court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
(continued) 
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There is no statutory definition of appeal limiting this 
Court's jurisdiction to legal issues. 
3. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
THAT ON APPEAL, THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO 
RESOLVE CASES IN WHICH THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED. 
In nominal reliance on State v. Lovegren, 143 Utah Adv. 
(footnote 3 continued) 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, 
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
for the exercise of the supreme court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause. 
The current Article VIII section 5 provides, 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, shall 
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the supreme court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
The previous Article VIII section 9 provided, in part, 
From all final judgments of the district 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the 
record made in the court below and under such 
regulations as may be provided by law. In equity 
cases the appeal may be on questions of both law 
and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone. . . . 
(emphasis added). 
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Rep. 9 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990), this Court remanded this case 
to the trial court for additional findings. Slip opinion at 1 
and 2. In so doing, this Court either accepted without scrutiny the 
State's unsupportable assertion that the facts in this case "as in 
Lovegren," are "greatly disputed,"4 or overlooked established law. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized, 
[A] remand is not necessary if the evidence in 
the record is undisputed and the appellate court 
can fairly and properly resolve the case on the 
record before it. 
Flvina Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). 
See also State v. Robinson and Towers, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 19 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)("Although we would ordinarily remand for the 
requisite finding on voluntariness and any necessary subsidiary 
factual findings by the trial court as factfinder, we conclude that 
the record at the suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed and 
complete to allow us to determine on the undisputed facts whether 
the State has met its burden of proof on the voluntariness 
issue.")(citations omitted); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586-587 
4. Appellee's brief at 5. As Mr. Hubbard argued in his 
reply brief, and as can be confirmed by referring to the trial 
transcript in the appendix to that reply brief, there are no 
significant factual disputes in the record before this Court. The 
only factual dispute that Mr. Hubbard's counsel was able to identify 
was resolved against Mr. Hubbard by the trial court, and is 
immaterial to the issues raised by Mr. Hubbard. See reply brief at 
2 and 3. 
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n.l (Utah 1982)(appellate court is not bound by legal conclusions of 
trial court, but may determine the question). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Because the material facts in this case are undisputed, 
this Court should exercise its jurisdiction to reach the merits of 
this case. In so doing, this Court will inform the State that in 
seeking to justify warrantless searches, this Court's standards of 
basic fairness and judicial economy will neither tolerate nor 
encourage substandard performance by the State in the trial courts. 
This petition for rehearing is filed in good faith and not 
for purposes of delay this Zj_ day of / \fi^Jf}^\}{/\ , 1990. 
gKtZflBETO LHOILBROOK 
Attorney fojr^ Mr. Hubbard 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, 
-
 9 -
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
1990. 
day of NHIAA 
DELIVERED BY this 
Of 1990. 
day 
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APPENDIX 1 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
F I L E D 
mm 41990 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS C ^ y W / f e ^ ^ ^ 
ooOoo 
^rci*f> <?" *» Court 
Uwh C^i^^ A create 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lorenzo H. Hubbard, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 900128-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 14, 1990) 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant Lorenzo H. Hubbard appeals from his conviction 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1990). On appeal, defendant requests this court to reverse and 
remand for a new trial due to the trial court's alleged error 
in denying his motion to suppress. The State argues this court 
should remand to the trial court for more detailed findings of 
fact. We agree and remand. 
Because the issues presented in search and seizure cases 
are highly fact sensitive, detailed findings are necessary for 
this court to conduct meaningful appellate review. State v. 
Lovearen, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990). 
Moreover, Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) requires findings where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion. 
Generally, this court will not disturb a trial court's findings 
of fact underlying a motion to suppress unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Id. However, such deference can only be accorded 
when the findings disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. 
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress because: 1) the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop; 2) the 
detention exceeded its proper scope; 3) the prosecution failed 
to prove the consent was voluntary; 4) the consent was tainted 
by a prior illegality; and 5) the officer exceeded the scope of 
the consent. The trial court entered an order stating, in 
part, "the Court then found there was consent to search the 
car, the person of the defendant and the defendant's wallet; 
that the consent was voluntarily given; that the investigatory 
stop was justified." The court also made sketchy oral findings 
involving whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
justify the initial stop and whether the officer obtained 
defendant's consent to search the vehicle and defendant's 
wallet. 
However, the findings entirely fail to address several of 
the critical issues and are inadequate to provide meaningful 
appellate review. "Though the decision not to suppress may 
have been correct, the critical 'issues are for the trial court 
to decide and . . . the findings of fact must reveal how the 
court resolved each material issue.'" Id. As in Lovegren, we 
reject defendant's contention that remand for findings is 
unnecessary. Id. at 12 n.ll. We therefore remand for more 
detailed factual findings. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Gregorjr^K. Orme, J u d g e 
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